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Introduction
Migration is a process which has existed 
since ancient times. It affects every dimen-
sion of social existence, and develops its 
own complex dynamics. According to UN 
DESA reports, in 2015 the number of inter-
national migrants worldwide was 243.7 mil-
lion (3.3% of the world population)4 and the 
global population of international migrants 
is growing at about 1.6 percent anually. From 
2000 to 2015, high-income countries received 
an average of 4.1 million net migrants each 
year from lower- and middle-income coun-
tries. The 2016 UNHCR Global Trends report 
finds 65.3 million people (or one person in 
113) were displaced from their homes by 
conflict and persecution in 2015; they are 
now asylum seekers, internally displaced 
or refugees5. The great majority of people 
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in the world are not international migrants. 
However, communities everywhere and peo-
ple’s way of life are changed by migration, 
and we therefore live in the age of migration 
(Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009).
Different types of problems arise when 
studying international migration. There are 
two main issues: who are the immigrants 
(refugees, asylum seekers, economic mi-
grants etc.) and how many are there in the 
receiving countries. Geographers especially 
are also interested in detecting immigrants’ 
and refugees’ countries of origin or the de-
parture countries. These questions are com-
mon among scholars investigating immigra-
tion. King and Öberg stated that the terms 
used for immigrants in different countries 
often have different meanings which are spe-
cific to those countries (King, R. and Öberg, 
S. 1993). Fassmann and Münz pointed out 
other problems – apart from the complica-
tions around definitions of terms – like the 
poor quality of data or historical issues 
around citizenship and the registration of im-
migrants (Fassmann, H. and Münz, R. 1994). 
As King and Öberg concluded, these issues 
“make any study of contemporary European 
migration very difficult, especially regarding 
statistical data” (King, R. and Öberg, S. 1993, 
2) and 23 years later these problems still ap-
ply to the study of immigration.
Short overview of the history of migration 
studies and theories
The number of the publications about inter-
national migration is enormous; it is impos-
sible to look at and study them all. Here we 
provide a brief overview of the main theories 
of migration particularly from a geographi-
cal perspective. Geographers made a signifi-
cant contribution to the study of migration 
(Robinson, V. 1996). “Migration is clearly a 
space–time phenomenon, defined by thresh-
olds of distance and time; this makes it in-
trinsically geographical” (King, R. 2011). In 
his paper, King selected four geographers’ 
works which contributed to migration theory 
the most significantly: Raveinstein, Zelinsky, 
Mabogunje and Hägerstrand, arguing that 
they had an influential effect on other schol-
ars’ work on this issue (King, R. 2011). 
Migration is a very complex process. 
Richmond states that theories of migration 
can be classed according to the level of analy-
sis as macro (focusing on migration streams, 
describing the conditions and the outcome of 
migration) and micro (socio-psychological and 
personal adaptation studies) (Richmond, A.H. 
1988). According to Massey and her colleagues, 
the study of international migration has often 
fallen into two rather separate bodies of so-
cial scientific investigation: 1) research on the 
determinants, processes and patterns of mi-
gration, and, 2) research on the ways in which 
migrants become incorporated into receiving 
societies (Massey, D. et al. 1993). Castles and 
Miller argue that this distinction is artificial, 
and detrimental to a full understanding of the 
migratory process. In their view, the second 
area should be understood more broadly as the 
way in which migration brings about change in 
both sending and receiving societies (Castles, 
S. and Miller, M.J. 2009).
Determinants, patterns and processes of migration
Migration studies started to develop at the 
end of the 19th century. It is an interdis-
ciplinary field that encompasses history, 
geography, political science, ethnology, 
anthropology, demography and sociology. 
This is reflected in the myriad of different 
approaches and methods of research. Prob-
ably the economic theories of migration are 
the most well-known of all. One of the domi-
nant and the most simplistic amongst them 
is the so-called neoclassical theory, or push-
pull theory, which has its antecedents in the 
work of Ravenstein (Castles, S. and Miller, 
M. J. 2009). According to this theory, migra-
tion is governed by unfavourable conditions 
(poverty, oppression) which push people out 
and favourable conditions in another loca-
tion (better economic opportunities) which 
pull people in. 
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This theory was widely criticised and re-
searchers altered this migratory model by 
adding a wider range of factors to the mi-
gration process (Castles, S. and Miller, M. 
J. 2009). In the late 1970s, Piore introduced a 
new approach, the dual labour theory, which 
considers a subdivided labour market with 
two sectors: one has demand for highly ed-
ucated employees and provides them with 
high wages, while the other is character-
ised by low wages and uncertain working 
conditions (Newbold, K.B. 2014). Stark and 
Bloom introduced the new economics of la-
bour migration approach and argued that 
decisions about migration lie in the hands of 
a family rather than an individual and that 
the decision-making process is influenced by 
such other factors as access to credit, remit-
tances and the volatility of local agricultural 
markets (Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009; 
Newbold, K.B. 2014). These theories, how-
ever, focus mainly on the economic factors 
in people’s choices. 
There are other explanations of interna-
tional migration trends which attempt to 
take note of different characteristics and fac-
tors. The world systems theory expresses the 
importance of globalisation in the process of 
international migration (Newbold, K.B. 2014). 
Castles and Miller described this theory as 
focussing “on the way less developed ‘pe-
ripheral’ regions are incorporated into a 
world economy controlled by ‘core’ capital-
ism” (Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009, 26). 
The institutional theory emphasises the role 
of different institutions and organisations, 
arguing that they promote or facilitate mi-
gration (Newbold, K.B. 2014). The migration 
systems theory has its background in ge-
ography and incorporates both ends of the 
migratory process as well as the connections 
or linkages between them (Castles, S. and 
Miller, M.J. 2009). The social network theory 
concerns mechanisms for the perpetuation of 
international migration and focuses on micro-
level elements, like families, friends and im-
migrant communities (Newbold, K.B. 2014).
As the migration process is very complex, 
in recent years these theories have been de-
veloped further, becoming more sophisti-
cated approaches that take into considera-
tion age, education, family status and other 
important personal characteristics which can 
influence people’s decisions and therefore 
facilitate or retard migration. 
A big shift has also occurred in terms of 
viewing the interaction of migratory pro-
cesses with different social spaces. Whereas 
previously migration was looked at as a rather 
directed movement with a point of departure 
and a point of arrival, it is now increasingly 
understood as an on-going movement be-
tween two or more social spaces or locations. 
This is captured by the terms transmigrant 
and transmigration. “Transmigrants are 
people who belong to more than one world, 
speak more than one language, inhabit more 
than one identity, have more than one home, 
who have learned to negotiate and translate 
between cultures, and who, because they are 
irrevocably the product of several interlock-
ing histories and cultures, have learned to live 
with, and indeed to speak from, difference. 
They speak from the ‘in-between’ of different 
cultures” (Inda, J.X. and Rosaldo, R. 2002).
Types of migratory movement can be 
forced and voluntary, long-term and short-
term (Richmond, A.H. 1988). As already 
mentioned, migration can be planned as only 
short-term for a certain period, but may also 
last longer and sometimes there will be no re-
turn to the country of origin (Lados, G. and 
Hegedűs, G. 2016). The duration of migra-
tion may be difficult to determine, as in the 
beginning the migrants may consider it only 
temporary but then change their mind. This 
happened in North America and Europe with 
the temporary workers of the 1960s, who later 
settled down and brought their families over, 
forming new ethnic minorities (Van Hear, N. 
2010). In some cases, people still consider their 
migration temporary even though they have 
been living somewhere for many decades. 
Sometimes there is no possibility of returning. 
This leads us to the next types of migration – 
voluntary and involuntary (forced) migration. 
According to some researchers, there is a 
fundamental difference between whether 
Kocsis, K. et al. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 65 (2016) (4) 369–390.372
people themselves decide to migrate (for eco-
nomic reasons) or are forced to leave their 
homes due to war or persecution. Others, 
however, complicate this distinction and do 
not distinguish between voluntary and invol-
untary migration (Fischer, P.A. et al. 1997; 
Jürgenson, A. 2011). Fischer and his col-
leagues argue that involuntary migrants try 
to minimise their risks rather than maximise 
their utility (Fischer, P.A. et al. 1997). Van 
Hear, in addition to these, brings in one more 
type of migration – mixed migration, which 
is the intersection between voluntary and 
forced movement. It is argued that migration 
can be mixed in several senses: motivations 
about making the decision to move; travelling 
with others in mixed migratory flows; moti-
vation changes en route; ending the journey 
in mixed communities (Van Hear, N. 2010). 
The previous study shows very clearly that 
it is, in many cases, difficult to distinguish 
between voluntary and forced migration and 
that there is no agreement on this dichotomy 
amongst migration researchers.
Migrant experiences of incorporation into 
receiving societies old models and transnationalism
The second, larger field of migration studies 
is research on the ways in which migrants 
become incorporated into receiving societies. 
The focus here is on the receiving society and 
the migrants’ personal settlement experience. 
This field started to bloom as an area of aca-
demic research after World War II, especially 
in the United States, where the rapidly grow-
ing migrant communities in cities were in-
tensely researched. These communities were 
looked at as enclave societies with relatively 
intact cultures. The traditional “melting pot 
ideology” emphasised acculturation, treat-
ing minority cultures in urban contexts as 
conservative, maladaptive residues, ‘surviv-
als’ resisting cultural change to the dominant 
white mode (Lewis, W.A. 1978). In migration 
research, the assimilation model was preva-
lent from the beginning of the 20th century 
until the 1990s. It predicted an eventual blend-
ing of immigrant strains into a single novel 
amalgam (Zelinsky, W. and Lee, B.A. 1998). 
According to the assimilation model, newer 
and newer waves of immigrants all start from 
low positions, and as they gain better status in 
society they will be absorbed into the domi-
nant community (Massey, D.S. et al. 1993).
The second half of the 20th century provided 
more and more examples of deficiencies in 
the assimilation model. The segmented ad-
aptation theory is based on three factors: 1) 
the nature of migration to the host country 
(forced or voluntary); 2) the resources that 
immigrants bring; and 3) the host country’s 
reception (Portes, A. and Zhou, M. 1993; 
Skop, E.H. 2001). Woltman and Newbold 
consider the segmented assimilation theory 
(“discrimination and unequal opportunities 
affect processes of adaptation”) “in the con-
text of how the adaptation of Cuban émigrés 
differs along lines of race” (Woltman, K. and 
Newbold, K.B. 2009). Skop argues the same 
issue in respect of the adaptation of Mariel 
exiles (Skop, E.H. 2001). Zelinsky and Lee 
pointed out the impact of new technologies on 
immigrants’ socio-spatial behaviour – inno-
vations revolutionised the late 20th century’s 
communication, providing new prospects for 
people to maintain contact, create and keep 
their social networks – envisaging a mosaic 
of self-sustaining ethnic communities instead 
of a melting pot (Zelinsky, W. and Lee, B.A. 
1998). They argue that this approach can 
cope with the diversity of immigrants and 
they characterise it as a pluralist approach. 
A study of immigrants in London has shown 
that these two models can co-exist in the same 
city – ‘assimilationism’, being played out by 
the Caribbeans, and pluralism as the path be-
ing followed by Bangladeshis (Peach, C. 1968; 
Zelinsky, W. and Lee, B.A. 1998).
Brief history of international migrations 
concerning Europe
As we may learn from the Atlas of Migration 
(King, R. et al. 2010), migration is not a new 
phenomenon in human history, but rather 
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an “ever-present theme”. Earlier in time 
when national territories were not always 
defined by hard borderlines “the distinction 
between internal and international migration 
is meaningless. A more appropriate distinc-
tion is that between short- and long-distance 
movement” (Jones, H.R. 1990, 229). Many 
migration periods have shaped Europe’s 
social, economic, and political-geographic 
characteristics through human history. These 
events can be seen and analysed via different 
narratives: ecological, pioneering, Marxist 
and diaspora narratives (King, R. et al. 2010).
Before 1945
Early modern humans migrated from Asia 
to Europe during the Upper Paleolithic. Dur-
ing the first millennium BC, the migration 
of Celtic peoples in continental Europe and 
the expansion of the Ancient Greeks in the 
Mediterranean region were important phe-
nomena. At the time of the Roman Empire 
(from 1st century BC to 5th century AD), there 
was substantial intercontinental migration 
(affecting Europe, Asia and Africa), exempli-
fied by the dispersion of the Jews throughout 
the empire in the aftermath of the Jewish-Ro-
man wars (1st –2nd centuries AD). At the time 
of the Roman Empire and especially after its 
collapse, almost the whole of Europe was af-
fected – in the form of a military invasion 
– by the migrations of the Germanic tribes 
(2nd –5th centuries). Successive migrations of 
various peoples then followed (within Eu-
rope and often originating in Asia): Huns 
(4–5th centuries), Slavs (5–7th centuries), Avars 
(6–7th centuries), Turkic Bulgars (7th century), 
Hungarians (7–9th centuries), Moors (Islamic 
Arabs and Berbers from the Maghreb, 8–9th 
centuries), Cumans-Kipchaks, Mongols-Ta-
tars (11–13th centuries). 
Intercontinental migration was particularly 
significant in the first centuries of the Ottoman 
(Turkish) Empire (1299–1922), as it extended 
its control to Southeast Europe and North 
Africa. Such migration mainly took the form 
of Turkish colonisation in Europe and the 
deportation of European slaves to Asia and 
Africa. During this period (14–15th centuries), 
the Romani people (Gypsies) of Indo-Aryan 
ethnic origin migrated from Asia and settled 
in Europe. The period also saw the expulsion 
or emigration of Jews from Western Europe 
and the Iberian Peninsula, most of whom mi-
grated – in the form of West–East migration 
– to Eastern and Southeast Europe (Gilbert, 
M. 2010). Later, (16–17th centuries, during the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation) reli-
gious wars were the primary cause of inter-
national migration within Christian Europe. 
After the geographical discoveries and as part 
of the process of colonisation (mostly from the 
16th to 20th centuries), the most important inter-
national migration era was the New World: the 
Americas, Sub-Saharan Africa, Australia and 
Oceania “embracing some 55–65 million emi-
grants from Europe between 1820 and 1930, or 
about one-fifth of Europe’s population at the 
beginning of the period” (Jones, H.R. 1990). 
Until the end of World War II, emigration 
was a dominant phenomenon in Europe’s 
migration, but there were significant intra-
European spatial movements as well. Labour 
migration, which has been driven by indus-
trialisation, was significant. Britain, Germany 
and France were the most important receiv-
ing countries. “By 1851 there were over 
700,000 Irish in Britain … [and] 120,000 Jews, 
who came as refugees from the pogroms of 
Russia between 1875 and 1914 (Castles, S. 
and Miller, M.J. 2009). Germany had al-
most a million foreign workers in 1907 from 
Poland, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and 
other countries across Europe (Castles, S. 
and Miller, M.J. 2009). France had even 
more foreign workers; by 1911 their number 
reached 1.2 million, constituting 3 percent of 
the total population (Castles, S. and Miller, 
M.J. 2009). These immigrants had an essential 
role in the industrialisation of these countries. 
World War I changed the situation in Europe. 
During the war, many immigrants returned 
home, and there was a shortage of labour. 
France responded to this challenge by recruit-
ing workers and even soldiers from the colo-
nies: North Africa, West Africa, Indo-China and 
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China. Their numbers were altogether about 
225,000 (Castles, S. and Miller. J.M. 2009). 
In the interwar period the number of for-
eign workers (and immigration) was reduced 
due to the economic crisis and increased 
xenophobia. At that time, “France was the 
only Western European country to experi-
ence substantial immigration” (Castles, S. 
and Miller. J.M. 2009), and some French mi-
grants returned from North Africa. World 
War II and the military operations brought 
about large scale migration with huge num-
ber of refugees, displaced people and forced 
foreign labourers. In the post-war period, a 
new era began in Europe with fresh waves of 
international migration.
Since 1945
In the aftermath of World War II, millions of 
people were relocated, forcibly or voluntarily, 
in consequence of international and bilateral 
agreements (Ohligher, R. et al. 2003). Between 
1944 and 1947, 15.2 million Germans were 
forced to leave their homes under population 
transfers or through evacuation and flight 
(Kulischer, E.M. 1948). Europe still had a 
net loss of 2.7 million migrants between 1950 
and 1959, and the shift to a continent of im-
migration only occurred in the 1970s (Bade, 
K.J. 2003) despite the mass migration of guest 
workers to Western Europe. Although many 
of these guest workers were migrants from 
other European countries (Ireland, Finland 
and the Southern European countries), sig-
nificant numbers of them arrived from North 
Africa and Turkey (Bade, K.J. 2003; Castles, 
S. and Miller, M.J. 2009). In 1970–1971, the 
foreign resident population in 18 Western 
European countries comprised almost 11 
million people, and this number had risen to 
18.4 million by 1990–1991 (Fassmann, H. and 
Münz, R. 1994). During the post-war decades, 
there was also significant return migration of 
former colonists to their home countries after 
the colonies became independent (Castles, S. 
and Miller, M.J. 2009). Bade estimates that, 
taken together, return migration and immi-
gration involved between 5.5 and 8.5 million 
people in Europe after decolonisation (Bade, 
K.J. 2003). After the 1973 economic crisis, the 
character of immigration changed. In the 
Western European countries, net migration 
rates decreased as soon as these countries 
ceased recruiting foreign workers (Figure 1), 
and family-type immigration became more 
frequent (King, R. and Öberg, S. 1993; Cas-
tles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009). 
In the 1980s, the Eastern Bloc countries (in 
particular the Soviet Union and the German 
Democratic Republic) also recruited contract 
workers from Vietnam, albeit they were 
called trainees (Castles, S. and Miller. J. M. 
2009). Furthermore, since the 1960s students 
and highly skilled workers have been mov-
ing to Europe, and the continent has also 
provided home for refugees from troubled 
Asian and African countries (Castles, S. and 
Miller. J.M. 2009). 
Fig. 1. Net migration rate in Northern, Western and Southern Europe between 1960 and 2014. 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
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The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in 
the large-scale migration of ethnic Russians 
and other ex-Soviet citizens (Robertson, R.L. 
1996). In the meantime, “a new Eurasian mi-
gration system has emerged. Migrants come 
from Russia’s own distant provinces, such 
as the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia, 
from its ‘near abroad’ countries – the succes-
sor states in Central Asia and the Caucasus 
– and from ‘far abroad’ countries such as 
China, Turkey and Vietnam” (King, R. et al. 
2010). The estimated numbers of these work-
ers in Russia were 8 million, 2 million with 
and about 6 million without permission in 
2007 (King, R. et al. 2010).
In the 1980s and especially after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, European migration experi-
enced a rapid change again: many Southern 
European states became receiving countries, 
and net migration started to grow again in 
the Western European countries (Figure 1). 
Creating a single market and the enlarge-
ment of the European Union, all contrib-
uted to the changing features of European 
immigration. “This geopolitical shift co-
incided with the acceleration of economic 
globalization, as well as an increase in vio-
lence and human rights violations in Africa, 
the Middle East, Asia and Latin America” 
(Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009). From 
the beginning of the 2000s, net migration 
increased rapidly as “economic globaliza-
tion continued to increase commercial and 
employment opportunities” (Castles, S. 
and Miller, M.J. 2009). Many Central and 
Eastern European countries became receiv-
ing countries after 1990. With EU member-
ship, however, the historical East–West 
migration resumed. There are no reliable 
data about how many EU citizens from the 
former communist countries are working in 
the more developed areas of the EU. Still, 
Eurostat data indicate that in 2015, 4.78 mil-
lion EU citizens from the former communist 
countries were residing in other EEA states 
and in Switzerland, whereas only 312,000 
EU citizens from the rest of the EEA and 
Switzerland were living in the post-commu-
nist EU member states (Figure 2).
According to UN data, the international 
migrant stock of non-European immigrants 
has increased significantly since 1990, from 
almost 20 million to 35.3 million. In 2015 the 
five largest non-European resident popula-
tions were in Russia (6.9 million), UK (5.4 
million), France (5.1 million), Germany (4.8 
million) and Spain (3.6 million) (Figure 3).
Immigration to Europe has been character-
istic and significant since World War II, but 
the countries of origin of the migrants have 
not been constant. Since 1990, the largest 
numbers of immigrants to Europe have come 
from Kazakhstan, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria 
and Uzbekistan, but many people have also 
come from India, China and Pakistan. In the 
case of the EEA countries and Switzerland, 
the greatest numbers of new arrivals have 
come from Turkey, Morocco, the Russian 
Federation, Algeria and India.
Allochthonous minorities and foreign-born 
populations resulting from international 
migration
As a consequence of international migration 
that occurred in the second half of the 20th 
century, Europe experienced sharp increases 
in the absolute and relative population size 
of the so-called allochthonous (“newcomer”) 
Fig. 2. Number of EU citizens from the former com-
munist countries in the rest of EEA and Switzerland; 
and number of citizens from the rest of the EEA 
and Switzerland in the post-communist EU coun-
tries between 2006 and 2015). Source: http://appsso.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_
pop3ctb&lang=en
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minorities and the foreign-born population. 
In general, cross-border migration means the 
arrival of people who differ from the receiv-
ing country’s population in terms of ethnic-
ity, language, religion and cultural traditions, 
but this is not always the case. Indeed, in re-
cent decades, many millions of people be-
longing to the European titular nations have 
migrated to the “kin-country” from foreign 
countries – either because of a political-eco-
nomic crisis or due to ethnic discrimination, 
examples are: Germans (“Spätaussiedler”) 
moving from Eastern Europe to Germany; 
Russians and Ukrainians from the ex-Soviet 
republics to Russia and Ukraine; Serbs and 
Croats from ex-Yugoslav republics to Serbia 
and Croatia; Hungarians from the neigh-
bouring countries to Hungary etc. Over the 
past half a century, there has been a tenfold 
increase in the number of people (currently 
67 million) belonging to the so-called alloch-
thonous minorities, which are communities 
that have been present in a country for less 
than a hundred year (Table 1). 
These new immigrant groups have set-
tled principally in Western Europe, where, 
in 2011, their share in the total population 
exceeded 15 percent. This particularly ap-
plies to those Western European countries 
(usually former colonial powers) that have 
the highest income and living standard as 
well as the best social welfare systems i.e. 
France6, Germany7, the United Kingdom8 
(16–10 million people in the allochthonous 
minority population), Spain9, Italy10 and the 
Netherlands11 (6–3 million people in the al-
lochthonous minority population). At the 
time of the 2011 censuses, the allochthonous 
minorities already included a large num-
ber (17 million)12 of Muslims (Arabs, Turks, 
Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Albanians), 
whose numbers were particularly high in 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Italy (Bottlik, Z. 2009). A significant differ-
ence between the eastern and western halves 
of Europe pertains to the relative sizes of the 
allochthonous minorities and the foreign-
born populations. The percentages of both 
are very high in Western Europe, but the size 
of the allochthonous minority population rel-
ative to the foreign-born population is higher 
in the West (due to the presence of the locally 
born descendants of the immigrants) and 
6 Arabs, Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards, Chinese, 
Turks, Poles.
7 Turks, Poles, Italians, Romanians, Greeks, Croats, 
Serbs, Albanians, Russians.
⁸ Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Germans, US-
Americans, Jamaicans, South Africans.
⁹ Romanians, Moroccans, Latin Americans, British, 
Italians, Germans.
10 Romanians, Arabs, Albanians, Chinese, Ukrainians.
11 Turks, Moroccans, Indonesians, Surinamese.
12 http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-
muslim-population-by-country/
Fig. 3. Non-European migrant stock with the largest number of immigrants in the European countries between 1990 
and 2015. Source: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.
shtml, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml
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Table 1. Allochthonous minorities and foreign-born population in Europe (1960, 2011)
Region
allochthonous minorities foreign-born population allochthonous minorities
foreign-born 
population
in thousands in percent






















*Post-communist countries of Europe, including the European parts of Russia. Sources: Calculated by K. 
Kocsis based on Bruk, S.I. and Apenchenko, V.S. ed. 1964, census data (ethnicity, citizenship, foreign-born 
population, migration) and estimations of ethnic communities. Foreign-born population: http://data.un.org/
Data.aspx?d=pop&f=tableCode%3A44
lower in the East, where a large proportion of 
foreign-born immigrants belong, ethnically, 
to the titular nations. During the period un-
der discussion, international migration has 
evidently been characterised by the arrival 
of “home comers” in Eastern Europe and of 
“exotic newcomers” in Western Europe. 
Between 2011 and 2015, the ratio of foreign-
born persons in the European Economic 
Area13 and Switzerland – the main destination 
areas for international migration in Europe – 
increased from 10.5 percent to 10.7 percent. 
In 2015, the share of foreign-born popula-
tion was particularly high in the richest and 
smallest countries: Liechtenstein (63.7%), 
Luxembourg (44.2%) and Switzerland 
(27.4%). Countries with lowest shares of for-
eign-born population were Romania (1.4%), 
Poland (1.6%) and Bulgaria (1.7%) (Figure 4). 
The corresponding figure in Hungary was 
4.8%, mainly due to Hungarians who moved 
to the country from the ethnic Hungarian-
inhabited areas of the adjacent countries. 
People born outside the EU accounted for 
64 percent of the total foreign-born popula-
tion in the area under inquiry (the EEA and 
Switzerland). The number of people born 
outside the EU is particularly high (4–6 
million) in each of the following countries: 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy 
13 European Economic Area (EEA): the European 
Union’s 28 member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway. For the purposes of this study, we 
have also included Switzerland, an EFTA member 
that is not an official member of the EEA but which 
is tied to it by bilateral treaties.
and Spain. The major groups of people born 
outside the EU are the Turks in Germany, 
the Indians and Pakistanis in the United 
Kingdom, the Algerians and Moroccans in 
France, the Moroccans, Ecuadorians and 
Colombians in Spain, and the Albanians 
and Moroccans in Italy. This population 
percentage is negligible (0.5–1.7%) in the 
former communist countries lying between 
the Baltic and Black seas (Slovakia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary). 
As far as Estonia, Latvia and Croatia are 
concerned, politically motivated migration 
(rather than economic attraction) explains the 
relatively high share of people born outside 
the EU. In the case of Estonia and Latvia, the 
major factor is the politically motivated set-
tlement of Russians (with smaller numbers of 
Belarusians and Ukrainians), who came from 
other parts of the Soviet Union between 1945 
and 1989. In Croatia’s case, the high percent-
age of people born outside the EU (12–14%) is 
due to the influx of ethnic Croatian refugees 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia at 
the time of the Yugoslav wars (1991–1995).
European migrant crisis: motivations and 
sending countries
After the decline in the waves of migration 
caused by the collapse of the European com-
munist regimes14, the year 2015 saw – partly 
14 For example, the Croatian and Bosnian wars (1991–1995) 
and the Kosovo Crisis (1990–1999).
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in consequence of the events of the “Arab 
Spring” of 2011 – a dramatic increase in il-
legal immigration, as asylum seekers reached 
Europe from neighbouring areas in Asia and 
Africa (Figure 5). 
In 2015, almost 1.3 million15 new asylum 
applications were submitted in the EU. This 
15 By the end of September 2016, 598,826 new asylum 
applications had been registered.
was more than double the previous record 
for such applications, which had been record-
ed in 1992 (after the outbreak of the Bosnian 
war). The question arises: How does the cur-
rent migration crisis differ from earlier such 
crises? The following possible answers can be 
formulated: an unprecedented number of mi-
grants/refugees arrived in the EU (the high-
est number since World War II); the migrants 
Fig. 4. Foreign-born population in the countries of the EEA and in Switzerland (1 January, 2015). Source: see the map
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arrived predominantly by sea and from very 
great distances; the earlier crises were more 
geographically concentrated in terms of both 
the countries of origin and the countries of 
destination; the motives for migration and 
the national (ethnic) composition of the mi-
grants are far more complex and diverse now 
than they used to be; today’s migrants target 
– in a far more conscious fashion than did 
their predecessors – the Western European 
countries with their stronger economies and 
higher living standards; several European 
countries at the forefront of events were sub-
jected relatively rapidly and unexpectedly 
to substantial migration pressures (e.g. Italy, 
Greece, Hungary, Croatia).16
There are numerous global and regional 
causes of migration into Europe and the sud-
den acceleration of such migration. Among 
these factors, emphasis should be given to 
the social and demographic factors, in particu-
lar intercontinental demographic imbalances, 
namely the fact that the European countries 
find themselves in the fourth and fifth (the 
low stationary and declining) stages of the 
demographic transition. These stages are 
characterised by population stagnation/de-
16 http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/Is-this-refugee-crisis-
different.pdf
crease, low birth rates, and an ageing popu-
lation (Káčerová, M. et al. 2014). In contrast, 
the Afro-Asian regions (Muslim Africa17 
and Southwestern Asia18) neighbouring 
Europe, which are inhabited predominant-
ly by Muslims, are in the second and third 
(early and late expanding) stages of the de-
mographic transition: dynamic population 
growth (in some locations, a veritable “popu-
lation boom”), high birth rates, falling death 
rates, and a rapid increase in the percentage 
of young people of working age who are 
most inclined to migrate (Figure 6). 
Between 1950 and 2015, the population of 
Europe grew by a third (owing basically to 
immigration into Western Europe), where-
as in the same time interval Muslim Africa 
and SW Asia experienced an almost fivefold 
population increase. In Syria, which is cur-
rently the principal source of immigration 
to Europe, the population increased by a fac-
tor of six during this period, while in Iraq 
17 Muslim Africa: countries in Africa with majority 
Muslim populations: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, 
Western Sahara.
18 Southwesten Asia: Asian countries of the Middle 
East, Caucasus countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Fig. 5. Change in number of first time asylum seekers in the EU and Germany (1980–2016). 
Source: http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers
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the population increased by a factor of 5.4. 
In several of the Afro-Asian countries under 
inquiry, the societal motives for migration 
include a very high level of ethnic and religious 
diversity, which has been and remains a 
constant potential source of conflict. In this 
regard, the most unstable countries in SW 
Asia are: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Pakistan, Syria and Turkey.19
In the source areas of intercontinental migra-
tion, the local economy, GDP growth, and job 
creation could not keep up with the popula-
tion boom and demographic growth described 
above (Figure 7). Coupled with other economic 
factors (e.g. the global economic and financial 
crisis), all this has resulted in a rapid rise in 
unemployment and, in the first instance, in 
growing domestic (rural→urban) migration. 
Natural factors (e.g. climate change, deser-
tification, water scarcity, and other natural 
hazards) have exacerbated the migration 
process. Most of the source areas for Afro-
Asian migration to Europe lie in the arid and 
semi-arid regions of dry climate zone, where 
average annual precipitation is less than 250 
19 Afghanistan: 15% Shia Muslims; 42% Pashtun, 27% 
Tajik, 9% Uzbek, 8% Hazara, 4% Aimaq, 3% Turkmen; 
Iran: 16% Azerbaijanis, 10% Kurds, 6% Lurs, 2% 
Turkmens; Iraq: 65% Shia and 37% Sunni Muslims, 1% 
Christians; 20% Kurds; Lebanon: 27–27% Sunni and 
Shia Muslims, 40% Christians, 5.6% Druze; Pakistan: 
10–25% Shia Muslims; 45% Punjabi, 15% Pashtun, 
14% Sindhi, 8% Saraiki, 8% Muhajirs, 4% Balochi; 
Syria: 13% Shia Muslims, 10% Christians, 3% Druze, 
10% Kurds; and Turkey: 18% Kurds. https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
mm (Siegmund, A. and Frankenberg, P. 
2013). Studies on climate change and de-
sertification in the Middle East and on the 
socio-political effects of such phenomena 
have shown that the changes are adding to 
the aridity of the region and that increasing 
greenhouse gas emissions are significantly 
influencing climate change in the Eastern 
Mediterranean region (Gleick, P.H. 2014, 
Kelley, C.P. et al. 2015). In Syria, desertifi-
cation and poor groundwater management 
have led in recent years to significantly 
lower levels of agricultural production. A 
three-year drought occurred between 2007 
and 2010, which was unprecedented since 
climate records began. Around half a million 
workers who were previously engaged in ag-
riculture have moved to urban areas, where 
tensions increased steadily in the years prior 
to the outbreak of civil war.
In addition to the social, economic and 
natural causes outlined above, global and 
regional political factors (global political ri-
valries, local power changes, wars)20 also 
20 Sudanese civil wars (since 1955), conflicts, wars in the 
Horn of Africa (since 1961), Six-Day War (1967), Yom 
Kippur War (1973), Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), 
Kurdish-Turkish Conflict in Turkey (since 1978), 
Iranian Islamic Revolution (1978–1979), Iran-Iraq War 
(1980–1988), Gulf War (1990–1991), Iraq War (2003–
2011), Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), Civil wars 
in Afghanistan (1989–1992–1996–2001), American/
NATO War in Afghanistan (2001–2014), “Arab Spring”: 
Tunisian Revolution (2010–2011), Libyan Civil War 
(2011), Egyptian Crisis (2011–2014), Bahraini Uprising 
(2011), Yemeni Revolution (2011) and civil war (since 
2015), Syrian Civil War (since 2011).
Fig. 6. Change in population number of selected Eurasian and African macroregions (1950–2015). 
Source: https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/
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lie behind international migration. As far 
as the present European migration crisis is 
concerned, the most influential factor has 
been the so-called “Arab Spring”21 (2010–
2012). The associated revolutionary events 
had several triggers: the global economic 
crisis that began in 2008, the gap between 
demographic and economic growth, social 
inequality, unemployment, poverty, and in-
creasing corruption. The “Arab Spring” led 
to civil war in Libya and Syria and to the 
fall of governments in Tunisia, Egypt and 
Yemen. In most cases, democratisation did 
not follow the overthrow of the authoritar-
ian regimes. Instead, extreme Islamist forces 
came to power, precipitating general chaos 
and civil war in many places. For this rea-
son, the ensuing period has been called the 
“Arab Winter”.22 The political events and 
wars described above have destroyed much 
of the local economy. In this regard, the fall 
in GDP was particularly significant (–64%) 
in Iraq under Saddam Hussein (1979–2003) 
and in Syria since the outbreak of the civil 






The social, economic, natural and politi-
cal factors underlying migration into Europe 
are extremely interwoven and mutually re-
inforcing. This multifaceted and cumulative 
crisis in the Afro-Asian region is the subject 
of our investigation. Only in the mid-term 
is there any hope of mitigating or “resolv-
ing” the crisis in the various places. During 
the European migrant crisis (taking January 
1, 2014 as a starting date), in the EEA coun-
tries, 1.2 million new asylum applications 
were made by August 31, 2015 and 2.7 mil-
lion by August 31, 2016. Southwestern Asia 
accounted for 61.7 percent of the applications 
(Figure 9). 
In the migration processes described here 
(which have various motives), the most 
important source countries were Syria, 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan (which ac-
count for 27.5%, 13.3%, 8.7% and 3.7% re-
spectively of all applications submitted in 
the EEA). 
Migrants – almost exclusively Muslims 
– who have left their homes in the conflict 
region between the Mediterranean Sea and 
the Himalayas currently constitute the most 
important source of international migration 
into the EEA. In the period 2011–2015, the 
largest increases in the number of persons of 
concern to the Office of the United Nations 
Fig. 7. Change in per capita GDP* in selected Eurasian and African macroregions (1950–2015). *GDP, in 2015 
USD converted to 2015 price level with updated 2011 PPPs. Source: https://www.conference-board.org/data/
economydatabase/index.cfm?id=27762
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High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 
refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced 
persons, stateless persons etc.) were recorded 
in Syria (from 1 million to 6.7 million) – ow-
ing to the Syrian civil war and the war against 
ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) –, in Iraq 
(from 1.7 million to 4.7 million), in Turkey 
(from 36,000 to 2.8 million), in Afghanistan 
(from 1.5 million to 1.8 million) – owing to 
the Afghanistan wars that have been raging 
Fig. 8. Change in total GDP* of selected countries in the Middle East (1950–2016, in millions of USD). *GDP, in 
2015 USD converted to 2015 price level with updated 2011 PPPs. Source: https://www.conference-board.org/
data/economydatabase/index.cfm?id=27762
Fig. 9. Asylum seekers in the EEA by country of origin (1 January, 2014 – 31 August, 2016). Source: see the map
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intermittently for almost a century– and in 
Pakistan (from 2.8 million to 3.4 million).23 
Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war 
in 2011, there has been a sharp increase in 
the number of Syrians fleeing to the neigh-
bouring countries of the Middle East. The 
most recent data of the UNHCR24 indicate 
that at least 4.8 million Syrians are currently 
registered in the neighbouring countries 
(2.8 million in Turkey, 1 million in Lebanon, 
655,000 in Jordan, and 229,000 in Iraq). In the 
period 2011–2016, the lack of any prospect 
of returning to Syria and the despair of the 
refugee camps led an increasing number of 
Syrians to travel to Europe through Turkey 
and by sea, with a view to seeking asylum in 
the EEA: 8,000 in 2011, 378,000 in 2015, and 
246,000 in 2016 (until August 31). The num-
ber of asylum applications made by Syrian, 
Afghan and Iraqi migrants in Europe peaked 
in the autumn of 2015 and then declined sub-
stantially from the early spring of 2016 after 
the EU and Turkey signed an agreement to 
stop irregular migration from Turkey to the 
EU (Statement of March 20, 2016).
Another significant source of migrants to 
the EEA is Sub-Saharan Africa (accounting for 
16% of asylum seekers in 2014–2016). Most 
of the people arriving from this region have 
come from Muslim areas in Eritrea, Somalia, 
Nigeria and Gambia. The motives for emigra-
tion among these African Muslim migrants 
are diverse: economic and political factors 
(demographic boom, unemployment, deserti-
fication, natural hazards, repressive regimes, 
civil wars, ethnic-religious conflicts etc.).
In the EEA, almost 11 percent of asylum 
seekers (298,000 persons) in the past three 
years have arrived from the Western Balkans 
(principally from Kosovo, Albania and 
Serbia). Most of these people are Muslim 
Albanians, Roma and Serbs. Most arrivals 
from the Western Balkans, who are usual-
ly treated as economic migrants in the EU, 
came to Western Europe before the spring of 




ulations. Factors causing them to leave the 
Western Balkans were economic problems, 
general poverty, corruption, dysfunctional 
government (Bosnia, Kosovo), and the lack 
of any prospect of EU membership (Kocsis, 
K. 2001). Most Eastern European asylum 
seekers arrived from Russia and Ukraine. 
In the case of the latter, they came mainly 
from areas affected by the recent civil strife 
(Karácsonyi, D. et al. 2014).
Main routes of the recent international 
migration into the EEA
The shortest land routes into the EEA for mi-
grants coming from Africa or Asia lead via 
the Spanish enclaves on Morocco’s Mediter-
ranean coast (Ceuta and Melilla) or via the 
Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Bulgarian bor-
ders. Between 1993 and 2005, to prevent what 
had initially been a large-scale illegal (mostly 
Sub-Saharan) African influx, Spain built and 
expanded border barriers around Ceuta and 
Melilla. Greece constructed a barrier along its 
border with Turkey in late 2012, while Bul-
garia did so in early 2014. 
After the closure of the land routes, 
the focus of the illegal border crossings 
switched to routes in the central and eastern 
Mediterranean. A 2008 agreement between 
Berlusconi (Italy) and Gaddafi (Libya) repre-
sented a temporary solution aimed at stop-
ping African migrants from reaching Italy. 
The agreement became defunct at the time of 
the Libyan Civil War (2011). In the chaos of 
war, Libya, which had no central government 
and the coutry was regarded as an ideal base 
for the human traffic networks, became an 
open gateway to Europe. The number of ille-
gal border crossings into Italy (mostly via the 
islands of Lampedusa and Malta) increased 
from 4,500 in 2010 to 170,760 in 2014.25 In ad-
dition to this Central Mediterranean route, 
where there have been several hundred 
fatalities, in 2015 the focus switched to the 
25 http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/central-
mediterranean-route/
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Eastern Mediterranean, where people can 
reach Europe by making a short sea journey 
(of no more than a few kilometres) from the 
Turkish coast to the nearby Greek islands 
(e.g. Lesbos, Chios, Kos). In consequence of 
these developments, the number of sea arriv-
als in Italy fell in 2015 by 153,000, while in the 
Eastern Mediterranean there was a surge in 
migration pressure (mainly on Greece, with 
the number of sea arrivals increasing from 
50,830 in 2014 to 885,386 in 2015).26 The large-
scale shift from the Central Mediterranean 
to the Aegean Sea reflects the fact that, in the 
period from January 1, 2014 until August 31, 
2016, 62 percent of first-time asylum seekers 
in the EEA were from Asia (due to the depar-
ture from Turkey of hundreds of thousands 
of Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis), whereby an 
additional factor was Bulgaria’s construction 
of a barrier along its land border with Turkey 
in 2014.27 In view of the geographical location 
of their countries of origin, almost three-quar-
ters of the migrants arrived in the EEA via the 
Balkans (or, indeed, originated from there). 
In recent years, there has been a sharp in-
crease in the number of illegal border cross-
ings in western and southern areas of the 
Balkans, while the directions and trends of 
such migration have changed. In terms of 
granting refugee status and the prospect of 
asylum, the EU drew a sharp distinction – as 
early as 2015 – between migrants from the 
Western Balkans (e.g. Kosovo Albanians, 
Roma people) and refugees from the Middle 
East (e.g. Syrians). In consequence of this dis-
tinction, the number of asylum seekers from 
Serbia and Kosovo declined to an eighth of 
the previous figure between February and 
September 2015, while there was a seven-
fold increase in the number of asylum seek-
ers from Syria. Instead of taking the tradi-
tional route from Turkey to Central Europe 
(Istanbul–Sofia–Belgrade), the migrants from 
Asia entered Europe via the Greek islands 




Belgrade route (Figure 10). Until the closure 
of the Hungarian-Serbian border (September 
15, 2015), which was followed by the con-
struction of the Hungarian border barrier, 
most migrants passing through the Balkans 
continued their journey to Western Europe 
(mainly to Germany) via Belgrade and 
Budapest (Figure 11). 
Subsequently, (owing to the construction 
of Hungary’s barrier along the Hungarian-
Croatian border in October), a huge migra-
tion pressure fell on the Croatian-Serbian, 
Slovenian-Croatian and Austrian-Slovenian 
borders. In response, in November 2015, 
Austria and Slovenia (and Macedonia too) 
began to erect barriers on their southern bor-
ders. The aim of such barriers was to halt the 
ever-increasing number of illegal migrants. 
Owing in part to these actions but mostly to 
the EU-Turkey statement (March 20, 2016), 
since late March 2016, the number of mi-
grants crossing by sea from Turkey to Greece 
has fallen to a mere fraction of the previous 
figure.28 In consequence, however, the migra-
tion pressure on Italy increased once more, 
leading to an equalisation of the annual 
number of registered illegal border crossings 
along the Central and Eastern Mediterranean 
routes (in the period until December 11, 
2016). On both routes, the numbers were 
reduced to a minimum in the period from 
October until the end of the year.29 
Main destination countries of the recent 
international migration concerning the EEA
From January 1, 2014 until August 31, 2016, 
2.7 million asylum applications were regis-
tered in the EEA countries, which may signif-
icantly exceed the actual number of asylum 
seekers, because as a person travels through 
Europe, he or she may be registered as an 
28 https://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/download.
php?id=2244
29 Eastern Mediterranean arrivals: 172,699, Central 
Mediterranean arrivals: 179,087 between January 
1 and December 11, 2016. http://data.unhcr.org/
mediterranean/regional.php
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asylum seeker in several different EU mem-
ber states (e.g. in Greece, in Hungary and in 
Germany). This explains why the number 
of applications is high both in the destina-
tion countries (Germany, in particular) and 
in some transit countries where migrants’ 
asylum applications were registered in line 
with the regulations (above all, in Hungary) 
(Figure 12).
The distribution of asylum applications 
shows significant geographical differences in 
terms of the sending countries, the entry routes 
of migrants, and their destinations. Almost 39 
percent of asylum applications were lodged 
Fig. 10. Most important routes of the non-European migrants in Southeastern Europe (2014–2016). Source: see the map
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by people from SW Asia (mostly Syrians and 
Iraqis). The greatest numbers were recorded 
in Germany and Sweden (or, in transit, in 
Hungary and in Austria) (Figure 12).30 
Out of almost 630,000 applications sub-
mitted by people from South Asia (mostly 
Afghans and Pakistanis), a third were regis-
tered by the German authorities, a sixth by the 
Hungarian authorities, and most of the rest by 
the Swedish, Austrian and Italian authorities. 
The highest numbers of North African Arab 
asylum seekers were seen in Germany and in 
France, and such applications formed the ma-
jority in Malta, which lies adjacent to Africa. 
Almost a half of arrivals from the western 
part of Sub-Saharan Africa were registered 
in Italy, while a significantly smaller propor-
tion was registered in Germany or in France. 
The largest numbers of East African migrants 
(coming mainly from Eritrea or from Somalia, 
where a civil war is raging) sought asylum 
in Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. In the 
period until the spring/summer 2015, many 
asylum applications were lodged in the EEA 
(particularly in Germany and – in transit – in 
Hungary) by people from the Western Balkans 
(mainly from Kosovo and Albania). Most 
30 http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_
monthly 
asylum requests made by Eastern Europeans 
(mainly Russians and Ukrainians) were regis-
tered in Germany, Poland and France. 
According to UNHCR data,31 legally speak-
ing, there were almost 3 million migrants re-
siding in the EEA by the end of 2015, where-
by only 49 percent had been granted official 
refugee status. The others were asylum seek-
ers (asylum seeker: application rejected or 
under adjudication, 36.1%) or stateless per-
sons (14.2%), or had some other legal status 
(0.7%). The number and percentage of per-
sons with refugee status is clearly the highest 
in those EEA countries with the highest living 
standards, which are the primary immigra-
tion destinations for migrants (Western and 
Northern Europe) (Figure 13). In these coun-
tries, migrants seeking a new home can rely 
on the networks that have been established 
by mostly Muslim immigrants over the years.
The number of persons with refugee status 
per 10,000 inhabitants is greater than 20 in 
these countries. The corresponding figure in 
countries of EEA with lower income that are 
less attractive to migrants – the former com-
munist countries, and Spain and Portugal 
– ranges from 0 to 5. A special category of 
migrants are stateless persons. These are peo-
31 http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern
Fig. 11. Detected illegal border-crossings in selected border sections of Southeastern Europe (2014–2016). 
Source: http://frontex.europa.eu/publications/?c=risk-analysis
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ple who have an attachment to their place of 
residence, are not eligible for citizenship, and 
do not regard themselves as refugees. The 
numbers and percentages of such persons 
are particularly high in the Baltic countries 
(principally in Latvia and Estonia). The ex-
planation for this phenomenon in the post-
Soviet republics is the presence of a large 
community of Russians (as well as smaller 
numbers of Belarusians and Ukrainians) who 
settled there between 1945 and 1989. Because 
they have not yet learned the official state 
language, these people have not acquired 
Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian citizenship.
Fig. 12. Asylum seekers in the EEA by macroregion of origin (1 January, 2014 – 31 August, 2016). 
Source: see the map
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During the recent European migrant crisis, 
the countries most affected by international 
migration targeting the EEA have been those 
situated in the most developed western and 
northern areas of Europe, which are par-
ticularly attractive to migrants, and those 
situated in the southern and south-eastern 
peripheral areas (e.g. Italy, Hungary, and the 
Fig. 13. Population of concern to UNHCR in the EEA by legal status (End of 2015). Source: see the map
Western Balkans), which have been particu-
larly affected by temporary/transit migration.
Conclusion
As far as intercontinental migration is con-
cerned, Europe was characterised by emigra-
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tion between the 16th and mid-20th centuries 
(partly as a consequence of colonisation) and 
mainly by immigration thereafter. In conse-
quence of post-WWII reconstruction, dy-
namic economic development, local labour 
shortages, and the decolonisation process, 
Western Europe received many migrants, 
initially from the Mediterranean region and 
subsequently (i.e. after the collapse of com-
munism in 1989/90) from the post-commu-
nist European countries. Meanwhile, the core 
areas of the EEA became the main destina-
tion for migrants coming from predominant-
ly Muslim regions in Asia and Africa. 
This important process has recently acceler-
ated and now constitutes mass migration. The 
global and regional causes of such intercon-
tinental migration in the sending areas are as 
follows: the population boom, economic back-
wardness, unemployment, growing poverty, 
climate change, desertification, global political 
rivalries and local power changes, growing 
political instability, wartime destruction, mul-
tiple and cumulative crises, general hopeless-
ness and despair. Partly in consequence of the 
events of the “Arab Spring” of 2011, in 2015 a 
wave of mass migration – mostly illegal im-
migration, with vast numbers of asylum seek-
ers – reached Europe from adjacent regions in 
Asia and Africa. 
The main features distinguishing this 
European migration crisis from earlier crises 
were: the arrival of an unprecedented num-
ber of migrants/refugees in the EU (the high-
est number since World War II); the migrants 
arrived predominantly by sea and from very 
great distances; the earlier crises were more 
geographically concentrated in terms of both 
the countries of origin and the countries of 
destination; the motives for migration and 
the national (ethnic) composition of the mi-
grants are far more complex and diverse now 
than they used to be; today’s migrants target 
– in a far more conscious fashion than did 
their predecessors – the Western European 
countries with their stronger economies and 
higher living standards; several European 
countries at the forefront of events were 
subjected relatively rapidly and unexpect-
edly to substantial migration pressures (e.g. 
Italy, Greece, Hungary, Croatia). The rapid 
construction of European border barriers and 
the signing of migration agreements with 
Europe’s neighbours (with Libya in earlier 
years, and more recently with Turkey) have 
very effectively influenced the direction and 
intensity of migration.
The global and regional causes of Afro-
Asian migration into Europe and the associ-
ated cumulative and multifaceted crises will 
not be resolved even in the medium term. 
Nor will the reasons for international migra-
tion cease to exist. 
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